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Abstract
Confidence intervals for the population mean of normally
distributed data are some of the most standard statistical
outputs one might want from a database. In this work
we give practical differentially private algorithms for this
task. We provide five algorithms and then compare them
to each other and to prior work. We give concrete, ex-
perimental analysis of their accuracy and find that our
algorithms provide much more accurate confidence inter-
vals than prior work. For example, in one setting (with
 = 0.1 and n = 2782) our algorithm yields an interval
that is only 1/15th the size of the standard set by prior
work.
1 Introduction
Estimating the mean of a population is one of the most
basic tasks in statistics. A medical researcher who wants
to know the average height of an adult male would gener-
ally get an estimate by measuring the height of a random
sample of people. But when this value is reported, statis-
ticians are usually careful not to just report a single point
estimate. They instead include some measure of the un-
certainty of this estimate. That is, what is the range in
which the true average of the population might plausibly
fall? This range is given as a confidence interval.
In classical statistics, confidence intervals are usually
easy to compute. It is often acceptable to assume that
continuous variables are (approximately) normally dis-
tributed. When estimating the mean of a normally dis-
tributed population, given a random sample, the most
accurate confidence interval is given by a simple calcu-
lation on the sample mean and sample variance. This
calculation has been known at least since the codifica-
tion of confidence intervals in 1937 [14]. However, things
become more complicated when confidence intervals are
being computed under the constraints of differential pri-
vacy.
When computing a confidence interval with differential
privacy, there are two sources of randomness to consider.
As in the public setting, there is the sampling variabil-
ity that arises when selecting a random sample of data.
Private algorithms introduce a second source of random-
ness in order to preserve privacy. There has been sur-
prisingly little work on the computation of private confi-
dence intervals. Karwa and Vadhan [10] study the prob-
lem in depth from a theoretical standpoint, finding an
algorithm with very good asymptotic performance, but
poor practical performance. They state that “designing
practical differentially private algorithms for confidence
intervals remains an important open problem, whose so-
lution could have wide applicability.” It is precisely this
open problem that we are attempting to solve.
Our main contribution is a set of five new, differen-
tially private algorithms that output a confidence in-
terval for the population mean of normally distributed
data. We do not assume that the population variance is
known. Two of our algorithms use Laplace noise, while
three others use an exponential mechanism-based algo-
rithm to report quantiles of the data.
All of our algorithms are experimentally verified to
confirm that the resulting intervals are valid. (I.e., they
cover the true population mean with the desired fre-
quency.) We also experimentally compare our algorithms
to the existing work on this question. We find that our
best algorithms consistently outperform prior work, of-
ten by large margins. For example, with ε = 0.1, a range
of [-32, 32], and a sample of size 2782, our best algo-
rithm gives an interval width approximately 2.43 times
that obtained without privacy, while the best prior work
algorithm gives an interval that is about 37.10 times as
wide. This means that the cost of privacy has been re-
duced by 96%.
We note also that many tasks in private data analy-
sis could probably be made more accurate by assuming
some information about the distribution of the under-
lying data. Our quantile algorithm, for example, when
applied to the median, gives a better estimate of the
mean of a normal distribution than does the standard
Laplace noise-based estimate. Given that many statis-
tical analyses being performed on private data already
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make these assumptions about its distribution, we see no
reason why privacy researchers should not measure util-
ity under these assumptions. (We stress that our privacy
guarantees do not depend on any assumptions about the
data.)
Our algorithms are all implemented and code is
publicly available at https://github.com/wxindu/
dp-conf-int.
2 Background
Below we first describe differential privacy, a well-
established security definition for the private release of
statistical queries on sensitive databases. We then dis-
cuss the particular sort of query that we study — con-
fidence intervals for the mean of normally distributed
data. Finally, we discuss how privacy interacts with the
goal of accurate confidence intervals and related prior
work.
2.1 Differential Privacy
We imagine an analyst who issues queries to a database
of private information. The analyst might be untrusted,
or they might be trusted but wish to release the query re-
sults publicly. Either way it must be guaranteed that the
output of the query protects the privacy of the individ-
uals whose data is contained in the database. Differen-
tial privacy [6] formalizes such a guarantee. Intuitively,
the guarantee given by differential privacy to an indi-
vidual is that any output will be roughly equally likely
regardless of what data that individual submitted to the
database. This implies that no adversary could infer
anything about an individual as a result of their partic-
ipation in the database. (This interpretation is subtle.
Interested readers should see [11] or [2] for more discus-
sion.)
To formalize this notion, we first define neighboring
databases.
Definition 1 (Neighboring Databases). Databases
x, x′ ∈ X are neighbors if one can be transformed to the
other by changing the value of a single row xi.
We can now define differential privacy:
Definition 2 (Differential Privacy). A query f is (ε, δ)-
differentially private if for all neighboring x, x′ ∈ X , and
for all sets S of possible outputs,
Pr[f(x) ∈ S] ≤ eε Pr[f(x′) ∈ S] + δ.
This definition, sometimes called bounded differential
privacy [12], is one of two common variants. The other
(unbounded) defines neighboring databases as having a
row deleted rather than changed. The only significant
difference is whether the size of the database must be
protected. Our algorithms achieve privacy with δ = 0, so
from here on we state theorems only for the δ = 0 case,
though the δ > 0 case is always similar.
The value ε > 0 is considered the privacy parameter.
Smaller values correspond to less information being re-
vealed about individuals in the database, thus stronger
privacy. A value of ε = 1 is fairly high but still mean-
ingfully protects privacy, while ε = .01 is quite low and
allows many more queries on the database to be released
while still maintaining a strong privacy guarantee, but it
also requires queries to be less accurate. The choice of ε
is a policy decision.
There are two particularly useful properties of differ-
ential privacy that warrant mention. The first, resis-
tance to post-processing, requires that anything com-
puted from private output is itself private. This is a
necessary feature of a good privacy definition, but it is
also a useful tool that allows the easy construction of
private queries.
Theorem 3 (Post-processing [6]). For an ε-differentially
private query f , and any function g, the query g ◦ f is
also ε-differentially private.
Next we give the standard composition theorem, which
shows that private queries can be combined in an accept-
able way.
Theorem 4 (Composition [6]). If query f1 is ε1-
differentially private and query f2 is ε2-differentially pri-
vate, their composition f(x) = (f1(x), f2(x)) is (ε1 + ε2)-
differentially private.
Composition allow for the idea of a privacy budget, a
total ε value that can be divided up as an analyst wishes
between any number of queries. It also allows complex
queries to be constructed from several smaller, simpler
queries.
Finally, we present two general methods for creating
private queries. The first is the Laplace mechanism,
which adds noise to a query to create a private version.
This noise must be proportional the sensitivity of the
non-private query, defined as the maximum effect a sin-
gle row can have on the output.
Definition 5 (Global Sensitivity). The sensitivity of a
function f : X → R, abbreviated ∆f , is defined as
∆f = max
x,x′∈X that
are neighbors
|f(x)− f(x′)|.
The noise added is taken from a Laplace distribution,
defined below.
Definition 6 (Laplace Distribution). The Laplace Dis-
tribution centered at 0 with scale b is the distribution
with probability density function:
pdf(z) =
1
2b
exp
(
− |z|
b
)
.
We write Lap(b) to denote the Laplace distribution with
scale b.
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This now allows a definition of the Laplace mecha-
nism, the most standard generic technique for privatizing
a given query.
Theorem 7 (Laplace mechanism [6]). Given any query
f : X → R, the query
f˜(x) = f(x) + L where L ∼ Lap
(
∆f
ε
)
is ε-differentially private.
In many cases the Laplace mechanism may not be ap-
propriate. For instance, the output of the query might
be categorical rather than numerical, or the query might
be numerical but does not have the property that values
close to one another have similar usefulness. In these
cases, the exponential mechanism can be a useful alter-
native. The exponential mechanism relies on a utility
function u : X ×R→ R which assigns a utility to any par-
ticular query response, given a particular database. (R
is the set of possible query outputs.) The utility function
has a sensitivity as well, defined as
∆u = max
x,x′∈X neighbors
r∈R
|u(x, r)− u(x′, r)|.
The exponential mechanism selects higher-utility out-
puts more often, with the probability of a given output
increasing exponentially with its utility.
Theorem 8 (Exponential Mechanism [13]). Given a
query f and a utility function u, define f˜ such that
∀x ∈ X ,∀ r ∈ R,
Pr[f˜(x) = r] ∝ exp
(
εu(x, r)
2∆u
)
.
Then f˜ is ε-differentially private.
The exponential mechanism is not necessarily ef-
ficiently computable, but it can be for particular
queries/utilities.
2.2 Confidence Intervals
In statistical inference, an analyst seeks to use a par-
ticular sample of data to infer attributes of the larger
population from which it was drawn. One common goal
is to estimate a population parameter θ. A confidence
interval algorithm takes as input a sample and outputs
a range in which the population parameter is likely to
fall. Note that we are now considering the database X
as a random variable.
Definition 9 (Confidence intervals). Given a database
X = (X1, ..., Xn) of i.i.d. samples from a population, a
confidence interval algorithm c outputs a closed interval
[a, b] ∈ R. An algorithm with confidence level (1−α), for
α ∈ [0, 1], has the property that
Pr[θ ∈ c(X)] ≥ 1− α.
The probability in the above definition is traditionally
taken over the randomness of the sample X, but it could
(and in the private case will) also be taken over the ran-
domness of c, were c to be a randomized algorithm. This
probability, Pr[θ ∈ c(X)], is called the coverage of the
confidence interval algorithm.
Of course, one could construct an interval which is
guaranteed to contain the true value by releasing all of
R, but this would not be useful. The goal is to release
a small interval, generally measured by the margin of
error (MoE), equal to half the interval’s width. (I.e.,
the margin of error for an interval [a, b] is (b− a)/2.)
It is acceptable for an algorithm to have coverage
greater than 1 − α, but generally when this is the case
there is some slack in the algorithm, and the interval can
be shrunk to obtain lower average margin of error.
The most well known type of confidence interval, and
the kind we focus on in this paper, is a confidence interval
for the mean of a normal random variable. In the public
setting, this is done with the following algorithm:
Definition 10 (Confidence Intervals for Normally Dis-
tributed Data). In the case where the sample comes from
a normal distribution, X1, ..., Xn ∼ N (µ, σ2), the optimal
(smallest MoE) (1− α)-coverage confidence interval is
c(X) =
[
X¯ ± s√
n
qn−1
(α
2
)]
,
where qn−1(α/2) is the α/2 quantile of the t-distribution
with n − 1 degrees of freedom, s is the sample standard
deviation, calculated using
s2 =
1
n− 1
n∑
i=1
(Xi − X¯)2,
and X¯ is the sample mean,
X¯ =
1
n
n∑
i=1
Xi.
2.3 Private Confidence Intervals
Despite the prevalence of confidence intervals in sta-
tistical applications, only a handful of papers have at-
tempted to give analysts a way to construct intervals in
the private setting. Awan and Slavkovic´ [1] derive op-
timal confidence intervals for binomial proportions, and
Sheffet [16] describes confidence intervals for private re-
gression coefficients under certain assumptions.
We are aware of three works that give algorithms for
the mean of normally distributed data, those of Karwa
and Vadhan [10], D’Orazio et al. [5], and Brawner and
Honaker [3]. Because we compare our work to these, we
discuss them in more technical detail in Section 3. Addi-
tionally, Gaboardi et al. [9] give a method for calculating
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confidence intervals in the more restrictive local differen-
tial privacy setting, in part using the same methods as
Karwa and Vadhan.1
This work on private confidence intervals is directly
motivated by attempts to move differential privacy into
practice, most specifically the PSI [8] project, which at-
tempts to provide an interface for basic statistics about
private data sets used in academic research.
The term “confidence interval” can be used in the pri-
vate setting in two different ways, which can be confus-
ing. It probably helps to consider the following three
kinds of confidence intervals:
Public interval for population mean This is the
standard sort of confidence interval thoroughly estab-
lished in statistics. The goal of the interval is to use the
sample data to give an interval estimating the popula-
tion mean, accounting for the variability induced when
selecting the random sample.
Private interval for sample mean This is a com-
mon tool in the practice of differential privacy, though
rarely discussed in the academic literature. When a
mean is reported (e.g., by adding Laplace noise) it is
often helpful to give the analyst an understanding of the
uncertainty, so a confidence interval can be constructed.
This interval is meant to show the uncertainty added by
the Laplace noise, so it takes into account only the ran-
domness of the private query. For simple things like the
Laplace mechanism, the confidence interval is trivial to
construct, though for others it can be very difficult.
Private interval for population mean This is the
subject of this paper. Here the goal is to give an interval
that will contain the population mean, but to make that
algorithm private. That means it must account for the
noise of both the random sampling and the private query
algorithm.
It is frequently noted in the differential privacy litera-
ture that the noise of private mechanisms is known and
can therefore be accounted for in statistical analysis, but
this accounting has rarely been studied and is actually
quite difficult. We believe it is unreasonable to expect
people who are not privacy experts to do this accounting
and that such an expectation deters the use of differen-
tial privacy. Furthermore, some private estimates allow
for more accurate noise-accounting than others. For ex-
ample, one could estimate mean and standard deviation
privately and then use the public confidence interval for-
mula, but such a method can fail to accurately guarantee
1Gaboardi et al. give asymptotic rather than exact analysis of
their algorithms, much like Karwa and Vadhan. For the sake of
comparison, we implement the work of Karwa and Vadhan and
give concrete comparisons. We do not do this for the Gaboardi et
al. work, as it is similar in design and in a more restrictive setting,
presumably therefore achieving worse performance.
coverage. Our goal here is to evaluate private algorithms
based on the utility of the final, usable output that a
practitioner will want to see.
Private confidence interval algorithms vary not just in
what margin of error they produce, but also in what
assumptions are required. These algorithms, both in
prior work and in our work, generally require that the
data is known to all come from a given range, i.e.,
xi ∈ [xmin, xmax]. (The algorithms work on more general
data, but values below xmin are set to xmin before other
calculations are performed, and similarly for xmax.) But
some algorithms are very sensitive to that range, degrad-
ing in accuracy very quickly if the range is overly wide,
while others are insensitive to the range, allowing the
analyst to give very conservative values.
Finally, we note that both here and in prior work,
the assumption that data is normally distributed is only
required for the coverage guarantees of the algorithm.
Privacy is required to hold in general for any input, re-
gardless of its distribution.
Relationship to hypothesis testing In the public
setting, confidence intervals are often discussed inter-
changeably with hypothesis testing, specifically a t-test.
A t-test asks whether a population with a hypothesized
mean could plausibly give rise to a sample with the ob-
served sample mean. The probability that such a mean
(or a more extreme difference) emerges is a p-value. It is
typical to check whether p < 0.05, and a p-value less than
0.05 will occur precisely when the hypothesized mean is
outside the resulting confidence interval. As such, any
algorithm that produces a confidence interval also pro-
duces a hypothesis test and vice versa.
In the private setting, this equivalence no longer holds.
Given a hypothesis test, one normally converts to a con-
fidence interval by asking, “At what value does the hy-
pothesis test start rejecting?” But private hypothesis
testing algorithms give a p-value at one point and can-
not be run repeatedly without losing privacy, so there is
no way to find where the cutoff for rejecting would be.
As a result, the work on private hypothesis testing in
this setting [4, 18] does not help us here.
3 Prior Work
Here we describe the three existing works that seek to
provide private confidence intervals for the population
mean of normally distributed data. We give a very
abridged overview of each algorithm; interested readers
should refer to the original works for more detail.
3.1 Karwa and Vadhan
The most mathematically sophisticated work comes from
Karwa and Vadhan [10]. They give algorithms for both
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the δ = 0 and the δ > 0 case. In both cases, their algo-
rithm begins by running a private histogram algorithm
on the data and uses that to estimate a range for the
data. The data is then clamped to that range. Given
that truncation, Laplace noise can be added to give a
private estimate of the mean and a private but very con-
servative estimate of variance, which are then used to
construct a confidence interval.
This work is impressive and has some very useful re-
sults. The margin of error is shown to be asymptotically
optimal, and the coverage guarantees hold for finite n,
rather than asymptotically2. For the δ > 0 case, they re-
quire no a priori bounds on the data. In the δ = 0 case,
they do require such bounds3, but the accuracy is not
highly sensitive to the bounds, so they can be set very
conservatively.
However, this work also has serious limitations. While
its asymptotic performance is excellent, its practical per-
formance is unacceptable. To quote the paper, “our algo-
rithms are not optimized for practical performance, but
rather for asymptotic analysis of the confidence interval
length. Initial experiments indicate that alternative ap-
proaches (not just tuning of parameters) may be needed
to [release] reasonably sized confidence intervals.” These
alternative approaches are exactly what we seek to de-
liver in this paper.
Algorithm 1 Vadhan
Input: x, α0, α1, α2, α3, ε1, ε2, ε3,
s¯min, s¯max, X¯min, X¯max
1: X˜min, X˜max ← RANGEFINDER(x, α3, ε3, s¯min, s¯max,
X¯min, X¯max)
2: Clamp x by X˜min, X˜max
3: X˜var ← X˜max−X˜minε1n
4: s˜var ← (X˜max−X˜min)
2
ε2(n−1)
5: X˜ ← X¯ + L1, where L1 ∼ Lap(X˜var)
6: s˜2 ← s2 + s˜var ln( 12α2 ) + L2, where L2 ∼ Lap(s˜var)
7: MoE←
√
s˜2
n qtn−1(1− α02 ) + X˜var ln( 1α1 )
Output: [X˜ −MoE, X˜ + MoE]
3.2 D’Orazio, Honaker, and King
D’Orazio, Honaker, and King [5] give several private al-
gorithms intended for use in social science research. The
only confidence interval they explicitly outline is for the
difference of means between two normally distributed
variables; however, their method can be easily adapted
to produce intervals for a single variable.
2This is somewhat misleading. For low n the algorithm will
output ⊥ instead of a confidence interval. Coverage is correct
whenever there is output, but the output is withheld for low n
because coverage would not be correct in those cases.
3In fact, they need bounds on both the mean and standard
deviation, which is stronger than simply having bounds that hold
with high probability on the minimum and maximum data values.
Their algorithm first uses a simple Laplace mechanism
query to estimate the sample mean. To get a confidence
interval, one needs to compute not just this mean but
also an estimate of the sampling variability of the sample
mean. To do this, they use an algorithm similar to one
of Smith [17]. They first divide the sample into disjoint
subsamples and from each calculate such an estimate.
This set of estimates S is then fed to a private quantile
algorithm to get estimates of the 25th and 75th quantiles.
This gives an interquartile range estimate r equal to their
difference and a center estimate c equal to their average.
The values of S are then truncated to be in [c−2r, c+2r].
The mean of S is then computed with Laplace noise to
ensure privacy.
Once there are estimates of the mean and sampling
variability, simulated data can be used to compute an
actual confidence interval. We use a similar simulation
technique for our algorithms, so we refer the reader to
Algorithm 3 and surrounding discussion for more detail.
3.3 Brawner and Honaker
Given a sample mean, statisticians can estimate the vari-
ance of that sample mean using bootstrap resampling [7].
Given a database x, a bootstrap sample y of the same
size can be computed by randomly sampling from x with
replacement. The mean of y is then computed and the
process is repeated many times. The distribution of the
means of those bootstrapped samples is a good approx-
imation of the sampling distribution of the mean of the
original database. For large n, the distribution is known
to be asymptotically normal, so the variance of the boot-
strapped samples is sufficient to allow the computation
of a confidence interval for the population mean.
Despite its prevalance in the practice of statistics, we
are familiar with only one (unpublished) paper on private
bootstrapping, that of Brawner and Honaker [3]. They
give a method that releases k means of bootstrapped
samples, each with 1/kth of the privacy budget. These
are used to calculate a variance estimate, and they’re
also averaged to create an estimate of the sample mean.
Crucially, it is shown that the sample mean estimate
arrived at this way is just as accurate as one computed
directly, but this method avoids the need to allocate part
of the budget to the sample mean computation. Given
these mean and variance estimates, a confidence interval
can be computed. Unfortunately, the variance estimate
can often be too low, resulting in unacceptable coverage,
but they give a method to conservatively increase the
variance estimate and achieve acceptable coverage.
This result is achieved under zero-concentrated differ-
ential privacy (zCDP) [19]. This privacy is parameter-
ized by ρ, and for any δ > 0 one can convert a guarantee
of ρ-zCDP into a guarantee of (ε, δ)-differential privacy.
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4 Algorithms
We introduce five algorithms to construct ε-differentially
private confidence intervals for the mean of normally dis-
tributed data. We start with the simple case, which uses
the Laplace Mechanism to produce private estimates of
mean and standard deviation. For the second, we mod-
ify this method to utilize an alternative dispersion metric
that results in a function with lower sensitivity. The re-
maining three algorithms rely on the exponential mech-
anism to generative private estimates of quantiles of the
data. Each of these methods take a different approach
for turning these quantiles into estimates of the center
and spread of the sample data, which are then used to
construct the confidence interval.
4.1 Noisy Mean and Variance
Our first approach is a direct application of Laplacian
noise to the sample mean and variance. The noisy mean
and variance are then used to construct the appropriate
confidence interval. In this algorithm and several future
algorithms, ρ is an allocation parameter that determines
the fraction of ε used at various stages of the algorithm.
We optimize this value experimentally.
Algorithm 2 Noisy Mean and Variance, NOISYVAR
Input: x, ε, ρ
1: x˜← x¯+ L1 where L1 ∼ Lap
(
(xmax−xmin)
ρεn
)
2: s˜ ←
√
max (0, s2 + L2),
where L2 ∼ Lap
(
(xmax−xmin)2
(1−ρ)εn
)
Output: x˜, s˜
Here x is any database, ε is the privacy parameter,
and 0 ≤ ρ ≤ 1 is the allocation parameter of ε among
queries. We define the sample mean x¯ = 1n
∑n
i=1 xi, and
the sample variance s2 = 1n−1
∑n
i=1(xi − x¯)2.
Lemma 11. ∆x¯ = (xmax−xmin)n .
Proof. Given x, x′ ∈ X that are neighbors, the entry that
was changed between them can only change value by at
most (xmax − xmin). As other entries remain unchanged,
the sum of all entries can be changed by at most (xmax−
xmin). When taking the mean of these databases then,
the mean can only change value by at most (xmax−xmin)n .
Thus ∆x¯ ≤ (xmax−xmin)n .
Lemma 12. ∆s2 ≤ (xmax−xmin)2n .
Proof. This proof modifies Honaker’s sensitivity proof
for variance estimator σˆ2 = 1n
∑n
i=1(xi − x¯)2. In its place
we use the unbiased sample variance s2 = 1n−1
∑n
i=1(xi−
x¯)2. See Appendix A for the full proof.
Theorem 13. NOISYVAR is ε-differentially private.
Proof. By composition, it is sufficient to show that x˜ is
ρε-differentially private and s˜ is (1−ρ)ε-differentially pri-
vate. In step 1 of NOISYVAR, the amount of noise added
is exactly Lap(∆x¯ρε ), thus x˜ is ρε-differentially private by
the properties of the Laplace Mechanism. Similarly, in
step 2 of NOISYVAR the amount of noise is Lap( ∆s
2
(1−ρ)ε ),
so s2 + L2 is (1 − ρ)ε-differentially private and by post-
processing, s˜ is (1− ρ)ε-differentially private.
Simulation When generating public confidence inter-
vals, a t-distribution is used to find the critical value and
margin of error for a confidence interval. In our case,
however, the addition of Laplacian noise to both the
standard deviation and the sample mean, renders the
t-distribution no longer appropriate. Reed in 2006 [15]
introduces the useful Normal-Laplace distribution and
provides its cdf and pdf. However, as we fail to invert
the cdf to construct a quantile function, the distribution
cannot be used for constructing a confidence interval. In
its place, we use simulation to construct the reference
distribution for the noisy sample mean with standard
deviation s˜. The margin of error is then estimated to
be half of the difference between the α2 quantile and the
1 − α2 quantile of the simulated reference distribution.
Let q(x, α) be a non-private empirical quantile function
that outputs the α quantile of sample x.
Algorithm 3 Confidence interval simulation, SIM
Input: α,A, x, ε, nsim
1: x˜, s˜← A(x, ε)
2: For i from 1 to nsim do
3: x′ ← x′0, ..., x′n ∼ N (x˜, s˜2)
4: x˜′i ← A(x′, ε)
5: MoE← q(x˜
′,1−α2 )−q(x˜′,α2 )
2
Output: x˜−MoE, x˜+MoE
The algorithm outputs a 1 − α confidence interval
through simulation. The input A can be any algorithm,
such as NOISYVAR, that outputs a private estimate of
mean and standard deviation when given a database x.
Since SIM only interacts with database x at step 1
through algorithm A, SIM is a post-processing algorithm
and preserves ε-differential privacy. In the following sec-
tions we focus only on algorithms which produce private
estimates of mean and standard deviation. This allows
a general application of SIM to construct confidence in-
tervals.
4.2 Noisy Absolute Deviations
While a private estimate of the standard deviation can
be made by adding noise to the naive estimator, previous
work has shown that one can increase utility by using an
alternative estimator, one with lower sensitivity [20].
Definition 14 (Mean Absolute Deviation). The mean
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absolute deviation of the sample x1, . . . , xn is
1
n
n∑
i=1
|xi − x¯|.
For normally distributed data x1, . . . , xn, the ratio of
mean absolute deviation to standard deviation is
√
2
pi .
The mean absolute deviation has lower sensitivity than
s2, therefore reducing the amount of noise necessary to
maintain privacy. We use 1n
∑n
i=1 |xi − x¯| ·
√
pi
2 to then
convert the mean absolute deviation to the sample stan-
dard deviation.
Algorithm 4 Noisy absolute deviations, NOISYMAD
Input: x, ε, ρ
1: x˜← x¯+ L1, where L1 ∼ Lap
(
(xmax−xmin)
ε1n
)
2: s˜ ← √pi2 · max(0, 1n∑ni=1 |xi − x¯| + L2), where L2 ∼
Lap
(
2(xmax−xmin)
(1−ρ)εn
)
Output: x˜, s˜
The sensitivity of sample standard deviation is√
(xmax−xmin)2
n while the sensitivity of the mean absolute
deviation is 2(xmax−xmin)n which is asymptotically smaller.
Lemma 15. ∆s˜ ≤ 2(xmax−xmin)n .
Proof. We show in Appendix A that the sensitivity of∑n
i=1 |xi − x¯| is bounded by 2(xmax − xmin). Thus the
sensitivity of s˜0 is bounded by
2(xmax−xmin)
n , and by post-
processing, ∆s˜ ≤ 2(xmax−xmin)n .
Theorem 16. NOISYMAD is ε-differentially private.
Proof. It is sufficient to show that s˜ is (1 − ρ)ε-
differentially private, since from the above section we
already know that x˜ is ρε-differentially private. In step 2
of NOISYMAD the noise added is Lap( ∆s˜
(1−ρ)ε ). Thus s˜ fol-
lows the Laplace Mechanism and is (1−ρ)ε-differentially
private.
Using the estimates of mean and standard deviation
given by algorithm NOISYMAD, we can construct a pri-
vate confidence interval using algorithm SIM.
4.3 Exponential Quantiles
The construction of confidence intervals for the mean of
normal data requires some measure of the center and
spread of the data. The first two methods address this
fairly directly, using noisy estimates of the two statistics.
A more flexible approach to estimating center and spread
is to work with quantiles. A single quantile is a location
statistic, telling us the magnitude of a particular part of
the distribution (e.g. the 10th quantile tells us where the
left tail is; the 50th tells us where the center is). With
two quantiles, it becomes possible to estimate the spread
of the data.
We introduce three approaches to computing the mean
and standard deviation of data using private quan-
tiles. All three methods rely on the algorithm below,
which outputs ε-differentially private estimates of any
desired sample quantiles using the exponential mecha-
nism. (This algorithm first appears in print in the work
of Smith [17], who credits it to McSherry and Talwar [13]
and personal correspondence. We know of no published
proof of its privacy. Under the unbounded differential
privacy definition the proof is almost trivial, but the
proof in the bounded case is a bit more complex, so we
include it here.)
To concisely explain the algorithm, we rely on the fol-
lowing notation:
• Allow that the values of any given database, x, are
sorted: x1 ≤ . . . ≤ xn.
• Allow for notational convenience that x0 = xmin and
xn+1 = xmax.
• Define bins B0, . . . , Bn ⊆ [xmin, xmax) s.t. Bi =
[xi, xi+1).
• Let m indicate the rank of the quantile of interest.
(I.e., xm is the ideal output.)
Since this algorithm uses the exponential mechanism,
we must define its utility function. This function is se-
lected such that utility increases as the number of data-
points that lie between a potential response and the true
quantile decrease. This results in values directly adja-
cent to the true quantile, xm, having the highest utility.
Let utility function Um : X × [xmin, xmax) → R s.t. ∀ i ∈
{0, . . . , n} and for all possible responses y ∈ Bi,
Um(x, y) = Um(x,Bi) =
{
i+ 1−m if i < m
m− i if i ≥ m
.
Algorithm 5 Exponential quantile, EXPQ
Input: x,m, ε
1: Define B0, . . . , Bn as above
2: For i from 1 to n do
3: pi ← |Bi| · exp( ε2 Um(x,Bi))
4: Normalize p0, . . . , pn s.t.
∑n
i=0 pi = 1
5: Sample i ∈ [0, n] from the distribution defined by
p0, . . . , pn
Output: Y ∼ Unif(Bi)
The range [xmin, xmax) is split into n+ 1 bins [xi, xi+1)
where i ∈ {0, . . . , n}. Each bin is assigned a utility score
based on its distance from the quantile of interest. Then
the exponential mechanism is used to select a bin. The
algorithm then randomly outputs a number from the
range of the selected bin.
We now show that EXPQ is ε-differentially private.
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Lemma 17. Given x, x′ ∈ X that are neighbors, and
their intervals B0, . . . , Bn, B
′
0, . . . , B
′
n, if y ∈ Bi then y ∈
B′i−1 ∪B′i ∪B′i+1.
Proof. Let x∗ be a database that has one entry less than
both x and x′, and let xj , x′k be the removed entries of
x, x′ such that
x0, . . . , xj−1, xj+1, . . . , xn+1 = x∗0, . . . , x∗n
= x′0, . . . , x′k−1, x
′
k+1, . . . , x
′
n+1.
So B∗0 , . . . , B∗n−1
= B0, . . . , Bj−2, Bj−1 ∪Bj , Bj+1, . . . , Bn
and B∗0 , . . . , B∗n−1
= B′0, . . . , B′k−2, B
′
k−1 ∪B′k, B′k+1, . . . , B′n.
So ∀ i, Bi ⊆ B∗i−1 ∪B∗i
and B∗i ⊆ B′i ∪B′i+1
=⇒ Bi ⊆ B′i−1 ∪B′i ∪B′i+1.
Thus if y ∈ Bi, then y ∈ B′i−1 ∪B′i ∪B′i+1.
Lemma 18. ∆Um = 1.
Proof. Given x, x′ ∈ X that are neighbors, and y ∈ Bi,
allow that x, x′ have quantiles of interest xm, x′m. By the
previous lemma, y ∈ B′i−1 ∪B′i ∪B′i+1. If i ≥ m, then
|Um(x, r)− Um(x′, r)| = |(m− i)− Um(x′, r)|
≤ |(m− i)− Um(x′, B′i±1)|
≤ |(m− i)− (m− i± 1)|
= | ± 1|
= 1.
If i < m, then
|Um(x, r)− Um(x′, r)| = |(i+ 1−m)− Um(x′, r)|
≤ |(i+ 1−m)− Um(x′, B′i±1)|
≤ |(i+ 1−m)− (i± 1 + 1−m)|
= | ± 1|
= 1.
Thus ∆Um = 1.
Theorem 19. EXPQ is ε-differentially private.
Proof. It is sufficient to show that EXPQ follows
the exponential mechanism with an output range of
[xmin, xmax). Let i, p0, . . . , pn be the final values of those
same variables in EXPQ.
Pr[EXPQ(x,m, ε) = y] = pi Pr[Y = y], Y ∼ Unif(Bi)
∝ pi 1|Bi|
∝ exp
( ε
2
Um(x,Bi)
)
= exp
(
εUm(x, y)
2∆Um
)
.
Thus EXPQ is ε-differentially private following the ex-
ponential mechanism.
Theorem 20. EXPQ outputs an unbiased estimator of
the median of symmetric data.
Proof. We prove Theorem 20 by showing that the ex-
pected output of EXPQ falls into bin Bm or bin Bm−1.
These bins are adjacent to the median, which implies the
expected output will be the median. See the full proof
in Appendix A.
Since our data are symmetrically distributed, the sam-
ple median is an unbiased estimate of the mean. There-
fore, the private median produced by EXPQ is an un-
biased estimate of the mean. The algorithm is slightly
biased when estimating other quantiles, but the bias is
practically insignificant for moderately sized n or ε. We
discuss this bias in Appendix B.
4.4 Centered Quantiles
The most straightforward application of EXPQ for con-
structing confidence intervals is to use its median esti-
mate as our mean estimate and use some other quantile
as an estimate of standard deviation. Let qZ be quan-
tile function of the standard normal distribution and b
be the choice of quantile. (We will choose b in practice
through experimental optimization.)
Algorithm 6 Centered quantiles, CENQ
Input: x, ε, ρ, b
1: x˜← EXPQ (x, bn+12 c, ρε)
2: d← EXPQ(x, bb(n− 1) + 1c, (1− ρ)ε)
3: s˜← max
(
0, d−x˜
qZ(b)
)
Output: x˜, s˜
Theorem 21. CENQ is ε-differentially private.
Proof. CENQ interacts with the database only through
two queries to EXPQ. The first query uses privacy pa-
rameter ρε and the second uses (1−ρ)ε. Thus by compo-
sition and post-processing, CENQ is ε-differentially pri-
vate.
4.5 Symmetric Quantiles
Here we take a different approach measuring the center
of the data. We use algorithm EXPQ to compute two
different quantiles an equal distance away from the me-
dian. The average of these quantiles is used to estimate
the mean while the difference is used to estimate stan-
dard deviation.
Theorem 22. SYMQ is ε-differentially private.
The proof proceeds in an analogous manner to that of
Thm. 21.
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Algorithm 7 Symmetric quantiles, SYMQ
Input: x, ε, b
1: d1 ← EXPQ
(
x, bb(n− 1) + 1c, ε2
)
2: d2 ← EXPQ
(
x, b(1− b)(n− 1) + 1)c, ε2
)
3: x˜← d1+d22
4: s˜← max
(
0, d2−x˜
qZ(1−b)
)
Output: x˜, s˜
4.6 Median of deviations
The final approach uses algorithm EXPQ to first com-
pute the median as our estimate of the mean. To esti-
mate standard deviation, we compute the distance be-
tween every datapoint and the estimated mean, then we
take the median of these distances to estimate standard
deviation.
Algorithm 8 Median of deviations, MOD
Input: x, ε, ρ
1: x˜← EXPQ(x, bn+12 c, ρε)
2: x′ ← |x1 − x˜|, . . . , |xn − x˜|
3: s˜← EXPQ(x
′,bn+12 c,(1−ρ)ε)
qZ(.75)
Output: x˜, s˜
Theorem 23. MOD is ε-differentially private.
Proof. MOD is another algorithm that composes and
post-processes two queries to EXPQ. The interaction in
step 2 is private since the database is only being modified
element-wise by x˜, and the only information read from
this new database is through the private query to EXPQ
at step 3. Thus MOD is ε-differentially private.
5 Experimental Results
Because we are focused on concrete performance at low
n, rather than asymptotic analysis, we must evaluate
our algorithms experimentally. The first thing we must
do is experimentally optimize the parameters of each al-
gorithm. Having done that, we must check that they
output confidence intervals with the promised coverage.
Finally, we must compare them to find the best algo-
rithm(s) and then compare those to prior work.
5.1 Parameter Optimization
The algorithms NOISYVAR, NOISYMAD, CENQ, and
MOD all require an ε allocation parameter than deter-
mines what proportion of the privacy budget is consumed
at different steps of the algorithm. Additionally, CENQ
and SYMQ have a parameter b which corresponds to the
quantile(s) used to estimate the standard deviation of
the database. In all cases, optimization was done exper-
imentally by varying ρ or b. See Appendix E for figures
demonstrating the experimental results. In principle, the
optimal parameter could be different for different choices
of n, ε, or range, but we found that in all cases we could
pick ρ or b values that were roughly optimal in all cases.
(In many cases, there was a large region of choices that
seemed roughly equally good.) These parameters were
fixed at the values given below, and all the following re-
sults use these parameter values.
Algorithm Parameters
NOISYVAR ρ = 0.8
NOISYMAD ρ = 0.85
CENQ ρ = 0.5, b = 0.65
SYMQ b = 0.35
MOD ρ = 0.5
5.2 New Algorithms
Our first experiments sought to determine which of our
own algorithms performed best. We compared them with
respect to their average MoE while varying other param-
eters.
Figure 1a shows the MoE of our algorithms at ε =
.01 and (xmin, xmax) = (−6, 6). By a database size of
roughly 1000, SYMQ is the clear winner, while for smaller
databases NOISYMAD was best. (We see that in general
NOISYMAD and NOISYVAR are almost identical in MoE,
with NOISYMAD consistently having an extremely slight
edge.) Figure 7 in Appendix D shows that these findings
are generally consistent across choices of ε.4 As a rule
of thumb, we find that SYMQ is the superior algorithm
once n > 100/ε.
Figure 7 also shows results as we vary the [xmin, xmax]
range in which the data is bounded. Recall that this is
a range given by the analyst, and all data outside the
range is moved inside it (set equal to xmin or xmax) be-
fore the algorithm is applied. Recall also that some of
the prior work goes through great pains to ensure that
this range is not needed or can be set very conserva-
tively. The Laplace noise algorithms, NOISYMAD and
NOISYVAR, are sensitive to this range, since their noise
is proportional to the range. As the range increases their
MoE increases significantly.
Significantly, we find that our quantile-based algo-
rithms are not sensitive to this range as long as n is
not very low. Widening the range only increases the
probability that the quantile algorithms pick the most
extreme bucket from which to sample. This bucket in-
creases in width proportionately to the range, but its
utility decreases exponentially with n. So for reasonably
small n, this exponential utility decrease is great enough
to make the probability of picking the outermost bucket
vanishingly small even when the range is set extremely
conservatively. Conveniently, this effect also seems to
4There are some exceptions with extremely low ε values and
very wide ranges, but our goal here is to find generally useful algo-
rithms, not ones that are marginally less horrible in a weird corner
case where everything is bad.
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show itself by the time n is approximately 100/ε. There-
fore we know that in that regime SYMQ is an extremely
precise algorithm that requires only extremely minimal
knowledge of the analyst. Figure 1 shows this for the
ε = 0.1 case. Compared to Figure 1, the Laplace noise-
based algorithms suffer greatly with a wider range, while
the quantile-based algorithms are unaffected. Figure 7
in Appendix D shows the same thing for other parameter
settings.
Figure 1: Comparison of our algorithms with respect
to their average MoE at various database sizes at two
different ranges with ε = .1. The distribution of the
underlying database was a standard normal, so an xmax
of 32 corresponds to 32 standard deviations away from
the mean.
We also need to confirm the validity of the algorithms.
That is, we must check that their coverage is truly at
least 1 − α. This must be done because the simulated
distribution used to calculate the MoE is based on an
estimated standard deviation for the underlying data. If
this estimate is bad enough, it could result in invalid
confidence intervals. To do this we run each test many
times at many α values and report the percentage of the
time that the true mean was included in the resulting
interval. Figure 2 shows one example, and Figures 9 and
10 in Appendix D show results at a variety of parameter
settings, always with similar (acceptable) results.
What we find is that coverage is generally acceptable.
(In these figures, “acceptable” means that the coverage
plots never drop below the diagonal.) The one possible
exception is the CENQ (centered quantiles) algorithm.
In some of the experiments it had slightly low coverage
for low ε values. Because it is so slight, more work be
required to determine for sure whether this was a real
issue or just experimental noise. However, CENQ is con-
sistently outperformed by SYMQ anyway, so it doesn’t
seem worthy of further investigation.
Figure 2: Comparison of our algorithms with respect
to coverage when the range is [−6, 6) and ε= 0.1. The
underlying distribution of the databases was a standard
normal distribution. n = 1000
We also check validity in a case where the analyst has
not set xmin and xmax so well. In particular, we imagine
that the true mean is not centered in the [xmin, xmax]
range and that potentially one side of the range is close
enough to the true mean to clip a significant number
of values. These results can be found in Figure 12 in
Appendix D. We find that NOISYMAD performs fine.
We see no problem with SYMQ when n > 100/ε. For
lower values of n, SYMQ does display poor coverage, but
at those values it is not the superior algorithm anyway.
5.3 Comparison to Existing Work
We then compare SYMQ (our best algorithm for n >
100/ε) and NOISYMAD (our best algorithm for lower n)
to the existing work described in Section 3. We used the
same experimental framework as we did before, and part
of the results we received are compiled in Figure 3. The
full results are shown in Figure 8 in Appendix D.
We varied ε, n, and the data range, and we found that
in all cases the lowest MoE algorithm was one of ours. In
most cases, both SYMQ and NOISYMAD outperformed
all prior work. The closest was the work of D’Orazio,
Honaker, and King [5].
We also compared coverage between the various al-
gorithms. We again estimated each algorithm’s cover-
age through simulation, at many different values of α.
The experimental results of our two best algorithms and
the previously existing algorithms are compiled in Figure
4. The same as before, our algorithms have coverage of
roughly 1−α, which is ideal. The Karwa and Vadhan [10]
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Figure 3: Comparison of our best algorithms to those
prior works with respect to their average MoE when the
range is [−6, 6) and ε= 0.1. The underlying distribution
of the databases was a standard normal distribution.
and Brawner and Honaker [3] algorithms have extremely
broad coverage, being much more conservative than is
necessary. This probably comes from the fact that they
use loose upper bounds to set the MoE, rather than pre-
cise simulation. Figure 11 in Appendix D contains the
same experiment run at a variety of range and ε values,
all with similar results.
6 Discussion
We have given two practical algorithms for producing
confidence intervals for the population mean of normally
distributed data. As long as n is somewhat large (at least
100ε), SYMQ performs very well with little drawback.
It allows the analyst to set the [xmin, xmax] window ex-
tremely conservatively, and the validity is resilient even
to a small mistake on the part of the analyst that clips a
portion of the data. When n is smaller, NOISYMAD
is superior (though in this case the analyst must set
[xmin, xmax] a bit more carefully to avoid adding too much
noise). It is worth taking a moment to think about why
the quantile-based method is so useful here.
Figure 5 shows the distribution of center estimates for
normally distributed data. The most accurate (highest-
peak) estimate is of course the sample mean. We also
show two private estimates, each at both ε = 0.1 and
ε = 0.25. One is the standard Laplace mechanism sample
mean estimate. The other is our exponential mechanism-
based quantile algorithm, EXPQ, used to find the me-
dian. In both cases the quantile algorithm gives a better
estimate.
We think this is likely to be part of a larger lesson.
Figure 4: Comparison of our best algorithms to those
prior works with respect to coverage when the range is
[−6, 6) and ε= 0.1. The underlying distribution of the
databases was a standard normal distribution.
Figure 5: Comparison of the distribution of a sample
mean, a private sample mean with Laplace noise, and
our exponential mechanism median estimate. n = 500,
ε = 0.1 or 0.25
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The laplacian mechanism is thought of as the “best” al-
gorithm for estimating means, and in some worst-case
sense this is true. Medians are thought to be harder to
calculate, since their worst-case sensitivity is high, and
more complex algorithms are needed. But when data is
“nice” or somewhat predictable, the median algorithm
is a better estimate of the mean than the “best” mean
algorithm. And much of statistics assume some simple
properties of the data distribution anyway, so these as-
sumptions are not additional limitations. We think pri-
vate algorithms should often take into account the likely
data distribution. Even when that distribution is not
known, using a small portion of the budget for an initial
check of possible special cases might often be worthwhile.
In particular, when statistical analysis assumes some-
thing about the data, the private version of the analysis
should be evaluated under the same assumption.5 Given
this, it makes sense to design special purpose queries that
will be more accurate on particular types of data.
In this work, we’ve given highly practical algorithms
for private confidence intervals. It is noteworthy that
our best algorithms are quantile-based, relying on an al-
gorithm that is excellent in this setting but that is not
an ideal way to measure the center of a set of arbitrary
data.
7 Conclusion
Our work attempting to find more powerful algorithms
for constructing private confidence intervals of the mean
of normal data has lead us to several algorithms that per-
form better at the task than the previously existing work
in this area. These algorithms show it is possible in prac-
tice to generate small confidence intervals while also pro-
viding strong privacy gaurantees. Our best algorithm,
the symmetric quantiles algorithm SYMQ, approaches
the public confidence interval quite rapidly for moder-
ately sized n and ε. Much of its good performance is due
to the exponential quantile algorithm, EXPQ, which pro-
vides us with more accurate estimates of the mean and
standard deviation of a sample than its laplacian noise
counterparts. The insensitivity of EXPQ to the database
range, xmin and xmax also allows our confidence interval
algorithms that rely on it to give small intervals despite
even the most conservative ranges.
5As stated before, this is how utility should be measured. Pri-
vacy usually should still be a worst-case notion.
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A Unbiased median estimation
Theorem 24. For a sample drawn from a symmetric
distribution with symmetric bounds, xmin, xmax, EXPQ
is an unbiased estimator of the median.
Let x be the expected value of a database drawn from a
symmetric distribution with symmetric bounds.
Let x1, ..., xn ∈ [xmin, xmax) be database x sorted where
x1 ≤ ... ≤ xn.
Allow for notational convenience that x0 = xmin and
xn+1 = xmax.
Let bins B0, ..., Bn ⊆ [xmin, xmax) st Bi = [xi, xi+1).
Let xm be the median of database x. If n is odd,
m = n+12 , if n is even, m =
n
2 .
Let utility function Um : X × [xmin, xmax) → R st ∀i ∈
[0, n+ 1], ∀r ∈ Bi,
Um(x, r) = Um(x,Bi) =
{
i+ 1−m if i < m
m− i if i ≥ m
.
Lemma 25. Given δ ∈ (0, xm) st ∀i, xm ± δ 6= xi,
xm − δ ∈ Bm−i =⇒ xm + δ ∈ Bm−i+1.
Proof. If n is odd, xm is the true median.
If n is even, xm is not the median, but as n → ∞, it
quickly approaches the true median.
Since the distribution of x is symmetric around the me-
dian, xm − xm−i = xm+i − xm.
Given δ ∈ (0, xm) st ∀i, xm ± δ 6= xi,
let i ∈ [1,m] st xm − δ ∈ Bm−i.
So xm−i < xm − δ < xm−i+1
=⇒ xm − xm−i+1 < δ < xm − xm−i
=⇒ xm+i−1 − xm < δ < xm+i − xm
=⇒ xm+i−1 < xm + δ < xm+i
So xm + δ ∈ Bm+i−1.
Proof of Thm. 24. It is sufficient to show that the pdf
of the output of EXPQ(x,m, ε) is symmetric around the
median, xm.
Since EXPQ follows the exponential mechanism, its pdf
must be
φ · exp
( ε
2
Um(x, r)
)
for some normalization constant φ.
Given δ ∈ (0, xm), suppose without loss of generality
that ∀i, xm ± δ 6= xi.
So Um(x, xm − δ) = Um(x,Bm−i) for some i ∈ [1,m]
= (m− i) + 1−m
= m− (m+ i− 1)
= Um(x,Bm+i−1)
= Um(x, xm + δ).
So φ · exp
( ε
2
Um(x, xm − δ)
)
= φ · exp
( ε
2
Um(x, xm + δ)
)
.
If n is odd, then the pdf of EXPQ is symmetric in the
range xmin, xmax around the median.
If n is even, then the pdf of EXPQ is symmetric in the
range xmin, xn around the median. The nonsymmetric
part of the pdf, [xn, xmax) = Bn has probability density
|Bn|φ exp
(
ε
2Um(x,Bn)
)
= |Bn|φ exp
(
ε
4n
)
. Since this
density approaches 0 rapidly as n→∞, the pdf of EXPQ
is asymptotically symmetric around the median.
Since the pdf of EXPQ is symmetric around the me-
dian, EXPQ is an unbiased estimator of the median.
B Biased quantile estimation
As we show above, EXPQ is unbiased for estimating the
median of normally distributed data. However, this does
not hold for other quantiles.
Let X be a random database drawn i.i.d. from a normal
distribution.
Let q be the index of the quantile of interest in the
database.
So the expected value of EXPQ(X, q, ε), an estimate of
the ( qn )
th quantile, is
E[EXPQ(X, q, ε)] =
∫ xmax
xmin
x · f(x)dx
Where f is the probability density function of
EXPQ(X, q, ε). Since f is constant within any bin we
can greatly simplify this expession as follows, denoting
this constant probability as pi for the i
th bin
E[EXPQ(X, q, ε)] =
∫ xmax
xmin
x · f(x)dx
=
n∑
i=0
∫ Xi+1
Xi
x · pidx
=
n∑
i=0
pi
∫ Xi+1
Xi
xdx
=
n∑
i=0
pi
X2i+1 −X2i
2
=
n∑
i=0
pi(Xi+1 −Xi)Xi+1 +Xi
2
Notice that Xi+1−Xi is the width of bin i and Xi+1+Xi2
is the midpoint of that bin. Although this expression
is concise, in practice it is very difficult to work with
analylitcally since the distance between Xi and Xi+1 will
depend on complex order statistics. Given index i, the
expected value of Xi is
E[Xi] =
∫ ∞
−∞
(i+ 1)
(
n
i
)
ϕ(x)i−1(1− ϕ(x))n−iΦ(x)dx
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Where ϕ(x) is the pdf of the normal distribution of
X, and Φ(x) is the corresponding cdf. It is easy to see
how unweildy this expression will make deriving analyt-
ical results for our estimator. For this reason, we choose
to implement this function and plot the bias in our esti-
mator empirically for various values of n and ε.
Theorem 26 (Variance Sensitivity following Honaker).
∆s2 =
(xmax−xmin)2
n .
Proof. Let x, x′ be two neighboring datasets which only
differ at the jth row. For simplier notation, we let x¯-j =
1
n−1
∑
i 6=j xi. Then the sample variance can be rewritten
as
s2 =
1
n− 1
n∑
i=1
(x¯− xi)2
=
n
n− 1 x¯
2 − 2x¯ 1
n− 1
n∑
i=1
xi +
1
n− 1
n∑
i=1
x2i
=
n
n− 1 x¯
2 − 2x¯ n
n− 1 x¯+
1
n− 1
n∑
i=1
x2i
=
1
n− 1
n∑
i=1
x2i − nn− 1 x¯
2
=
1
n− 1
n∑
i=1
x2i − 1n(n− 1)
(
n∑
i=1
xi
)2
=
1
n− 1
xj2 +∑
i 6=j
x2i
−
1
n(n− 1)
xj +∑
i 6=j
xi
2
=
1
n− 1
xj2 +∑
i 6=j
x2i
−
1
n(n− 1)
x2j + 2xj∑
i6=j
xi +
∑
i6=j
xi
2

=
1
n− 1
∑
i 6=j
x2i − 1n
∑
i6=j
xi
2
+
1
n(n− 1)
(n− 1)x2j − 2xj∑
i 6=j
xi

=
 1
n− 1
∑
i 6=j
x2i − 1n(n− 1)
∑
i 6=j
xi
2
+
n− 1
n(n− 1)
(
xj
2 − 2xj x¯-j
)
=
 1
n− 1
∑
i 6=j
x2i − 1n(n− 1)
∑
i 6=j
xi
2
+
1
n
(
xj
2 − 2xj x¯-j
)
Thus changing xj would only affect the latter term
1
n
(
xj
2 − 2xj x¯-j
)
. The difference between variance of x
and x′ would then be:
s2(x)− s2(x′) = 1
n
[
xj
2 − x′j2 − 2
(
xj − x′j
)
x¯-j
]
Now consider the partial derivative of the variance
function with respect to the jth observation:
∂s2
∂xj
=
2
n
(
xj − x¯-j
)
∂2s2
∂xj2
=
2
n
> 0
And thus among all possible values xj can take, the
variance s2 is minimized when xj = x¯-j and maximized
when xj is equal to the bound that’s farthest from x¯-j .
Thus the sensitivity bound of variance can be found to
be:
∆s2 = max
xj ,x¯-j
[
s2(xj)− s2(x′j)
]
= max
xj ,x¯-j
1
n
[
xj
2 − x′j2 − 2
(
xj − x′j
)
x¯-j
]
= max
xj ,x¯-j
[
1
n
(xj
2 − x¯2-j − 2(xj − x¯-j)x¯-j)
]
= max
xj ,x¯-j
[
1
n
(xj
2 − 2xj x¯-j + x¯2-j)
]
= max
xj ,x¯-j
[
1
n
(
xj − x¯-j
)2]
=
1
n
(xmax − xmin)2
Theorem 27. Bounding Sensitivity of f(x) =
∑n
i=1 |xi−
x¯|.
Proof. Consider an arbitrary change in a particular
database value xj , to a new value x
′
j . Setting d = x
′
j−xj ,
we notice that the altered mean, x¯′ = x¯ + dn . Now, we
bound the sensitivity as follows,
∆f = max
x,x′ neighbors
|f(x)− f(x′)|
= max
x,x′ neighbors
∣∣∣∣∑
i 6=j
|xi − x¯| −
∑
i 6=j
|xi − x¯′|
+ |xj − x¯| − |x′j − x¯′|
∣∣∣∣
≤ max
x,x′ neighbors
(∣∣∣∣∑
i 6=j
|xi − x¯| −
∑
i6=j
|xi − x¯′|
∣∣∣∣
+
∣∣|xj − x¯| − |x′j − x¯′|∣∣ )
Considering the cases
∑
i6=j |xi− x¯|−
∑
i 6=j |xi− x¯′| and
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Figure 6: The bias (As difference between true and expected value) of our estimator given different values of n and
epsilon
|xj − x¯| − |x′j − x¯′| separately, we have∑
i 6=j
|xi − x¯| −
∑
i 6=j
|xi − x¯′|
=
∑
i6=j
|xi − x¯| −
∑
i 6=j
|xi − (x¯+ d
n
)|
≤
∑
i6=j
|xi − x¯| −
∑
i6=j
|xi − x¯|+
∑
i 6=j
| d
n
|
= |d(n− 1)
n
|,
and
|xj − x¯|−|x′j − x¯′|
= |xj − x¯| − |xj + d− (x¯+ d
n
)|
≤ |xj − x¯| − |xj − x¯|+ |d|+ | d
n
|
= |d|+ | d
n
|.
So, putting the two together, we have
∆f ≤ max
d
(
|d|+ | d
n
|+ |d(n− 1)
n
|
)
=
(
1 +
1
n
+
n− 1
n
)
max
d
|d|
= 2 max
d
|d|.
Since |d| ≤ (xmax − xmin), ∆f ≤ 2(xmax − xmin).
C Details on D’Orazio and
Honaker’s algorithm
D’Orazio, Honaker, and King [5] describe a method for
calculating the standard error for a private estimate of
the difference in means between two normally distributed
random variables. This is a different case than we are
considering. However, the difference between two nor-
mally distributed random variables is itself normally dis-
tributed, so their method can be adopted easily enough
to our case. Making this change does mean we had to
slightly adapt some aspects of the algorithm, and for this
reason we have reproduced the exact algorithm we used
below.
A few changes and implementation details of note:
1. Although the algorithm used EXPQ to estimate the
first and third quartiles of the subsamlped estimates
of standard error, they did not give any details
about how the upper bound given to EXPQ was
determined. We felt that since this was a bound
on standard error rather than standard deviation,
it would need to depend on the size of the database
provided. To get around this, we pass a bound for
the actual standard deviation, sdmax and divide this
by
√
n to place a bound on the true standard error,
semax. However, this bound is likely not conserva-
tive enough because the standard errors will follow
their own sampling distribution based on the size of
the subsets. To address this, we add two standard
deviations of the standard error calculated on the
M subsets to semax. The standard error of the stan-
dard deviation calculated on each subsetis is approx-
imately sdmax√
2 nM
. After rearranging terms and scaling
by 1√
n
, we get that the standard error on our esti-
mates of standard error is sdmax·
√
M
n
√
2
. We then added
three times this value to our bound on the true stan-
dard error to get the value we pass to EXPQ.
2. The paper also did not give any discussion of how
to select the number of subsets on which to calcu-
late the standard deviation. Smith 2011 [17] gave a
heuristic of
√
n as the number of subsets for a similar
algorithm, but we found this to give too few groups.
Instead, we empirically optimized the group size at
various levels of n and interpolated to approximate
16
the best subsample size for a given database. We
found that for all the sample sizes we tried, the best
results occurred when the size of each subsample
was 2.
3. In the original paper, the Laplace noise added to
the winzorized mean has scale parameter |u−l|2εM . We
believe this is an error and that the value should
be 2|u−l|εM . This is because half of the ε budget is
consumed by the quartile estimates and so the sen-
sitivity |u−l|M should be divided by the remaining
ε
2 .
Algorithm 9 Construct D’Orazio Mean and SD, ORA
Input: x, ε,M, xmin, xmax, sdmax
1: x˜← x¯+ L1, where L1 ∼ Lap
(
2(xmax−xmin)
εn
)
2: semax ← sdmax√n
3: Divide dataset x into M subsets m1,m2, ...,mM .
4: For i← 1,M do
5: si ← sd(mi)√n
6: S ← s1, s2, ...sM
7: a← EXPQ
(
S, 14 ,
ε
4 , 0, semax + 2 · sdmax·
√
M√
2·n2
)
8: b← EXPQ
(
S, 34 ,
ε
4 , 0, semax + 2 · sdmax·
√
M√
2·n2
)
9: µ← a+b2
10: IQR← |a− b|
11: u← µ+ 2IQR
12: l← µ− 2IQR
13: For i← 1,M do
14: si ←

u if si > u
si if l < si < u
l if si < l
15: w ← 1M
∑M
i=1 si
16: s˜← w + L2, L2 ∼ Lap
(
2|u−l|
εM
)
Output: x˜, s˜
D Detailed experimental results
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Figure 7: Comparison of our algorithms with respect to their average MoE at various database sizes, ε values , and
ranges.
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Figure 8: Our best algorithms compared to prior work with respect to their average MoE at various databases
sizes, ε values and ranges.
19
Figure 9: The coverage of our algorithms at various significance levels, ε values and ranges. n = 1000
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Figure 10: The coverage of our algorithms at various significance levels, ε values and sample sizes.
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Figure 11: Our best algorithms compared to prior work with respect to their coverage at various significance level,
ε values and ranges.
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Figure 12: The coverage of our algorithms at various significance levels, ε values and sample sizes. Here the true
mean is 3 to test an off-center case.
23
E Parameter Allocation and Op-
timization
24
Figure 13: The performance of NOISYVAR at various database sizes varying ε-allocation. NOISYVAR tends to
perform the best when ρ is in the range of approximately (0.75, 0.85), where the MoE of confidence intervals are
minimized for all database sizes. We thus choose ρ = 0.8 as the optimized ε-allocation for NOISYVAR.
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Figure 14: The performance of NOISYMAD at various database sizes varying ε-allocation. NOISYMAD tends to
perform the best when ρ is in the range of approximately (0.75, 0.88), where the MoE of confidence intervals are
minimized for all database sizes. We thus choose ρ = 0.85 as the optimized ε-allocation for NOISYMAD.
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Figure 15: The performance of CENQ at various database sizes varying b, the percentile used for generating private
measure of spread, with ε-allocation ρ set to be 0.5. CENQ tends to perform better when b falls into the range of
approximately (0.65, 0.8), where the MoE of confidence intervals tend to be relatively small for all database sizes.
We here choose b = 0.65 as the optimized value of b for CENQ.
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Figure 16: The performance of CENQ at various database sizes varying ε-allocation, with b set to be 0.65. CENQ
tends to perform better with ρ in the range of approximately (0.5, 0.75), where the MoE of the confidence intervals
are small for all database sizes. We here choose ρ = 0.5 as the optimized ε-allocation.
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Figure 17: The performance of SYMQ at various database sizes varying b, the percentile used for generating private
measure of spread. SYMQ tends to perform better when b falls into the range of approximately (0.3, 0.45), where
the MoE of confidence intervals are minimized for all database sizes. We here choose b = 0.35 as the optimized
value of b for SYMQ.
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Figure 18: The performance of MOD at various database sizes varying ε-allocation. MOD tends to perform better
when ρ falls into the range of approximately (0.45, 0.55), where the MoE of confidence intervals are minimized for
all database sizes. We here choose ρ = 0.5 as the optimized value of b for MOD.
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